Marginalia — Cuaderno Interactivo Marginalia Li Countermeasures Power Side Channel2026

> PUBLICACIÓNJisuanji Xuebao/Chinese Journal of Computers (2026)

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The rapid advancement of quantum computing has posed significant threats to traditional public-key cryptosystems, making post-quantum cryptography (PQC) a central focus in the standardization of next-generation cryptographic systems. In 2024, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) formally established Kyber and Dilithium---both based on the Module Learning with Errors (MLWE) problem---as the FIPS 203 standard for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) and the FIPS 204 standard for digital signatures, respectively. As the transition to PQC progresses, increasing attention is being directed toward the physical security of cryptographic implementations in real-world environments. Lattice-based cryptography, which underlies these algorithms, introduces unique algebraic operations, including polynomial ring arithmetic, the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT), message encoding and decoding, boundary checks, and the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation. These operations result in distinct power side-channel leakage patterns that differ markedly from those of classical cryptosystems. The characteristics of lattice-based algorithms---including a broad attack surface, diverse computational operators, and high operational complexity---present substantial challenges for implementing effective countermeasures. This paper focuses on Kyber and Dilithium as key representatives of lattice-based PQC and systematically examines their vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks along with protection strategies. The contributions of this study are organized as follows: (1) Vulnerability Distribution and Leakage Mechanism Analysis: We reveal the distribution of side-channel vulnerabilities across lattice-based cryptosystems and analyze the underlying leakage mechanisms. By examining critical operations such as polynomial multiplication, NTT, and the encoding/decoding and sampling routines, we identify key points where sensitive information is at risk. These points are susceptible to various attacks, including Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), and template attacks. This systematic mapping provides insights into how sensitive information may be exposed during the execution of lattice-based operations. (2) Fine-Grained Protection Framework: We propose an integrated protection architecture aimed at addressing various vulnerabilities in a structured manner. This framework emphasizes operator-specific protection strategies---for example, dedicated masking and hiding techniques for NTT, secure and constant-time implementations for encoding and decoding modules, and designs resistant to side-channel attacks for sampling and NTT steps. This approach enables the development of a comprehensive protection landscape for Kyber and Dilithium, addressing both algorithmic and implementation-level challenges. (3) Evaluation of Existing Solutions and Practical Guidance: We assess state-of-the-art countermeasures regarding their design principles, implementation costs (such as area, performance, and energy overhead), and potential optimization pathways. Based on this evaluation, we offer practical recommendations for deploying these protections in real-world devices. Additionally, we identify key bottlenecks---such as the high cost associated with masking non-linear operations and the challenges of achieving constant-time execution in complex sampling routines. We also outline future research challenges, including the need for efficient high-order masking schemes and the development of evaluation methodologies specifically tailored to lattice-based cryptography. This study provides theoretical insights and practical guidelines for protecting against side-channel attacks in lattice-based cryptographic systems. Its goal is to support the secure and efficient implementation of post-quantum cryptosystems in real-world devices. By tackling both the theoretical and practical dimensions of side-channel resistance, this work contributes to the broader effort to ensure that the transition to PQC is both cryptographically strong and physically secure. \copyright 2026 Science Press. All rights reserved.

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